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THE OHIO RIOT LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
The reaction to the recent wave of civil disorders which have swept
the country has been intense and varied. Many articles have appeared
which treat civil disobedience as a distinct philosophical phenomenon or
as a result of social injustice.' The legislative responses to the riots have
been nearly as varied as the political slogans of "law and order" and that
of "meaningful justice." Some states have enacted statutes directed
at the unresolved grievances within the ghetto community caused by
discrimination and years of deprivation.2 Other legislatures have con-
centrated upon control of riots in order to maintain civil order. It seems
that the proper solution to the civil disorders should be a combination
of riot control measures and social programs. While long-range social
programs and reforms are necessary to remove the causes of the civil dis-
orders, riot control measures are also needed to deter large scale damage
to persons and property.
Ohio's response to the recent disturbances has been the enactment of
a number of riot control measures. This article deals with the content,
application and constitutionality of several of these recent statutes.
II. SECTIONS 2923.52 AND 2923.53:
RIOT IN THE FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE
Among the new riot statutes are the offenses of riot in the first de-
gree3 (hereinafter referred to as Riot I) and riot in the second degree4
1 For discussions on the problems involved in contemporary civil disobedience, see generally:
Allen, Civil Disobedience and the Legal Order, 36 U. CiN. L REV. 1 (1967); Black, The
Problem of the Compatibility of Civil Disobedience with American Institutions of Govern-
ment, 43 TEXAS L. REV 492 (1965); Freeman, Moral Preemption Part I: The Case for the Dis-
obedient, 17 HAST. LJ. 425 (1966); Freilich, The Emerging General Theory of Civil Dis-
obedience within the Legal Order, 45 J. OF URBAN L 563 (1968); Grimshaw, Changing
Patterns of Racial Violence in the United States, 40 NOTRE DAME LAw. 534 (1965); Keeton,
The Morality of Civil Disobedience, 43 TEXAS L. REv. 507 (1965); Lohman, Violence in the
Streets: Its Context and Meaning, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 517 (1965); Powell, A Lawyer Looks
at Civil Disobedience, 23 WASH. & LEE L REV. 205 (1966); Smith & Smith, First Amendment
Freedoms and the Politics of Mass Participation: Perspective on the 1967 Detroit Riot, 45 J.
OF URBAN L. 503 (1968); Stringfellow, The Violence of Despair, 40 NOTRE DAM LAW.
527 (1965); Wilkins, The Riots of 1964: The Causes of Racial Violence, 40 NOTIE DABME
LAw. 552 (1965); Note, Contemporary Civil Disobedience: Selected Early and Modern View-
points, 41 IND. L.J. 477 (1966).
2 The response is that of Wisconsin. As stated in STAFF, REPORT TO THE WISCONSIN
HousE JUDICIARy COMMrITEE ON CRIMnS AGAINST PUBLIc PEACE AND ORDER (1968) is
the following:
Notwithstanding the disorders which occurred in Milwaukee in the summer of
1967, there has been no request for legislation to tighten riot laws or provide
more effective penal sanctions against riots. However, a number of bills were intro-
duced in the Wisconsin legislature, directed at the underlying causes of social unrest,
such as inadequate housing, poverty and unemployment.
Also, the District of Columbia City Council recently passed a regulation limiting police use of
force. New York Times, Dec. 18, 1968 at 27.
3 OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.53 (Page Supp. 1968).
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(hereinafter referred to as Riot II). In the course of analysis each of the
statutes will first be outlined in its essential elements. Each element will
then be considered with regard to the meaning of the terms used within
it, the meaning of each element as a whole, its probable effect on the
application of the statute and possible Constitutional issues raised by it.
A. Riot in the Second Degree
The offense of Riot II consists of the following elements:
A. Participation with four or more persons in
B. Conduct which is (1) violent and (2) tumultuous
C. With the intent to (1) do a lawful act with unlawful force and
violence and in such a manner as to create a dear and present danger to
the safety of persons or property; or (2) prevent or coerce official action
or to hinder, impede or obstruct a function of government; or (3) com-
mit or facilitate the commission of a misdemeanor.
1. Participation
In Riot II, the participation which is proscribed refers to an activity
comprised of violent and tumultuous behavior rather than the several
intents embodied in the statute. Participation includes not only the situa-
tion in which five or more people engage in violent and tumultuous con-
duct in a coordinated fashion or with a common purpose, but also the
situation in which a person, not knowing the purpose of the violent and
tumultuous conduct of four or more others, joins in it with one of the
three intents contained in the statute.5 The requirement of participation
generally precludes the application of the section against non-participants
such as bystanders and the press.6  Once a bystander joins in the violent
and tumultuous conduct, however, he becomes a participant and may be
guilty of Riot II if he has one of the required intents.
2. Violent and Tumultuous Conduct
Violent and tumultuous conduct consists of conduct which is both
forceful and turbulent.7  Although both words apply to many types of
4 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.52 (Page Supp. 1968).
5This should be contrasted with OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2921.14 (Page 1953) entitled
"Conspiracy to Defraud the State." In reference to this statute it has been said that while some
act is required, it is essentially a crime of intent, and "[t]he unlawful combination and con-
federacy constitute the essential element of the criminal conspiracy rather than the overt acts
done in pursuance thereof...." State v. Lucas 39 Ohio Ops. 519, 520 (1959). The act also
makes each of the parties participating in the intent guilty of the crime. Under Riot II only
the person with one of the three enumerated intents could be convicted of Riot II and the four
or more others would not be guilty of the crime unless they also had one of these intents.
OThe possibility that an exception to this could occur through the Ohio aider and abettor
statute is considered in section III of this article.
7 BLAca's LAw DicnToNARY 1743 (4th ed. 1951) defines violent as "moving, acting, or
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conduct, it is possible to have situations in which the conduct is violent
but not tumultuous8 and even more likely to have conduct which is tu-
multuous but not violent.9 The statute requires that the conduct of the
individual to be charged and that of four or more other persons be both
violent and tumultuous.
3. Intent
The elements of intent listed in the statute seem to apply to the in-
dividual being charged rather than the four or more others who are act-
ing in a violent and tumultuous manner. Any of the four or more others
who did not have one of the required intents would not be guilty of
Riot II. This statute does not sanction the mass arrest of everyone in the
riot area even if they fail to disperse on order."0
characterized, by physical force, especially by extreme and sudden or by unjust or improper
force .. " While tumultuous was not found in any law dictionary examined, there are several
cases which have defined it. The most pertinent of these cases, State v. Brown, 69 Ind. 95
(1879), concerns a conviction under an 1878 Indiana riot statute which bears a strong resem-
blance to Riot II. In this case the court found that a charivari conducted with zeal and earnest-
ness was tumultuous. In a similar vein City of Madisonville v. Bishop, 113 Ky. 106, 67 S.W.
269 (1902) held that a group of people throwing fireworks in a Christmas celebration was tu-
multuous. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY at 2462 defines tumultu-
ous as "full of commotion and uproar."
8 While many lay dictionaries list violent as a synonym for tumultuous, it is possible for five
or more people to engage in violent behavior which is in fact very orderly. An example of this
would be a well executed robbery.
9 Tumultuous situations which do not necessarily involve violence are encountered quite
frequently. Examples would be a departing crowd from a movie or football game, a county
fair, or the sidewalks of a business district during rush hour. Many situations though not vio-
lent partake of the noise, confusion, and agitation characteristic of an unlawful assembly or its
acts. City of Madison v. Bishop, 113 Ky. 106, 67 S.W. 269 (1902).
10 Compare the narrowness of coverage of Riot 11 with the breadth of the following two sec-
tions of the MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
Section 250.2 of the Code states in part.
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct, if with purpose to cause public inconvenience,
annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he:
(a) engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior, or
(b) makes unreasonable noise or offensively coarse utterance, gesture or display,
or addresses abusive language to any person present; or
(c) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves
no legitimate purpose of the actor. (emphasis added)
Section 250.1.2 incorporates the above definition in providing:
Where [three] or more persons are participating in a course of disorderly conduct
likely to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, a peace
officer or other public servant engaged in executing or enforcing the law may order
the participants and others in the immediate vicinity to disperse. A person who re-
fuses or knowingly fails to obey such an order commits a misdemeanor. (emphasis
added)
In a comment the author notes that "... Subsection [250.1.2) mainly affects 'others in the
immediate vicinity"' and not the participants in the disorderly conduct.
Also compare the coverage of Riot II with former section 3761.14, § 1 No. 937 (1957) 127
LAws oF Omo 1106 (repealed 1968) which places criminal liabilities on all the persons who
are riotously assembled.
Whenever three or more persons are unlawfully or riotously assembled, all judges,
sheriffs, and other ministerial officers .. , shall make proclamation ... to disperse and
depart ... and if such persons do not then forthwith disperse and depart, such officers
A difficulty that arises with respect to both Riot statutes is the exact
content of the word intent. In acknowledgment of the ambiguity of this
word the Model Penal Code1 bases culpability on whether a person
"... acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may
require, with respect to each material element of the offense."' 2  The
difficulties encountered due to the vagueness of the word intent are easily
illustrated by its use in the first mental element of Riot II.
The first mental element of Riot II is the intent to do a lawful act
with unlawful force and violence in such a manner as to create a clear
and present danger to the safety of persons or property. This element is
so constructed that it is impossible to state its plain meaning. The am-
biguity arises from the four possible interpretations of the word intent' 3
and the possibility that intent could refer in any of its four meanings to
the following phrases: lawful act; force and violence; unlawful force
and violence; manner; manner as to create a dear and present danger.
shall call upon all persons... to aid and assist in dispersing and taking into custody all
such persons.
Both the Model Penal Code and former Ohio Revised Code section 3761.14 are alike in
the respect that all those in the riotous assembly, possibly including bystanders, may be taken
into custody if they fail to disperse upon the order of an appropriate public official. Riot J1 and
Riot I, however, require both participation and a defined intent to justify an arrest.
1 1 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
12 Id. § 2.02(2) provides:
(2) Kinds of Culpability Defined.
(a) Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result;, and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the exist-
ence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes they exist.
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circum-
stances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances
exist, and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically
certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
(c) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and de-
gree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circum-
stances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard
of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
(d) Negligently.
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he
should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and de-
gree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his
conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) at 12-13, 123-
132.
13 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
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In light of this ambiguity it is appropriate to consider the possible mean-
ing of intent in the light of various rules of construction.
Under the rule of strict construction a statute is ". . . interpreted
strictly against the state ...and liberally in favor of an accused." 14  As
purpose is the most aggravated form of criminal intent recognised by
the Model Penal Code,15 this rule would require that the actor have pur-
pose with respect to each part of the element.
While it is speculative whether intent includes knowledge, it appears
from several standpoints to be unlikely. First, Riot I explicitly mentions
culpability based on knowledge only with respect to the use of deadly
weapons.16 This could be interpreted as signifying that knowledge will
not suffice with respect to the other elements. Second, the Model Penal
Code, which bears a striking resemblance to many parts of Riot I and
Riot 111 uses the word purpose where the statutes use the word intent.
It is also relevant to note that as Ohio's criminal statutes are generally
couched in terms of "intent", it is quite possible that the legislature
merely substituted it for purpose without meaning to change the sub-
stance of the statutes.' 8
It is very unlikely that intent as used in the statutes includes either
recklessness or negligence. In Cox v. Louisiana9 Cox, the leader of a
peaceful demonstration, was convicted of a "disturbing the peace" statute.
The Court found that:
[tjhe statutory crime consists of two elements: (1) congregating with
others 'with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circum-
stances such that a breach of the peace may be occassioned, and (2) a re-
fusal to move on after having been ordered to do so by a law enforcement
officer. (emphasis added) 29
In addition it noted that:
[the Louisiana Supreme Court [had] in this case defined the term 'breach
of the peace' as 'to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to
interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet.' (emphasis added) 21
Based on the premise that peaceful demonstrations are forms of free
speech and free assembly, the Court found that statute unconstitutionally
14Columbus v. DeLong, 173 Ohio St. 81, 83, 180 N.E.2d 158 (1962).
15 See note 12 supra.
16 0Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.53 (Page Supp., 1968).
17 MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.1 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
'8 Compare the sections of the MODEL PENAL CODE set forth in note 10, supra, with
Riot I and Riot If. They are in many ways identical with the exception that the word intent is
substituted for purpose.
19 379 U.S. 536, 538 (1965).
20d. at 551.
21 Id.
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broad in scopeY2  It was felt that this definition"... would allow persons
to be punished merely for peacefully expressing unpopular views. 23
To contend that intent includes reddessness or negligence is to say
that a person may be guilty of Riot II if his otherwise legal behavior is
under circumstances such that a breach of the peace may be occassioned
or that it might arouse someone else to violate the law. Thus a person
whose sole purpose was to participate in a peaceful demonstration could
be held to have violated Riot II (or Riot I) if the peaceful demonstra-
tion was turned into a violent and tumultuous melee by the predictable
actions of hostile bystanders. This result would be contrary to Cox and
cause the statute to be held unconstitutionally broad in scope.
The interpretation of intent as purpose also serves to clarify the
connection between the elements of intent and the elements of conduct
in these statutes. That is, while one might contend that a literal inter-
pretation of this statute (as well as Riot I) would encompass a situation
in which a person while participating in violent and tumultuous assembly
was intending to prevent or coerce official action in a way that was com-
pletely unconnected with his conduct, it is highly improbable that this
was intended by the legislature. 4 When the word purpose25 is substi-
tuted for intent, the connection becomes clearer. It would make little
sense to contend that someone participated in violent and tumultuous
conduct with the purpose to commit a misdemeanor unless there is a
proximate or causal relationship between the behavior and the purpose.2 6
The purpose to do a lawful act with unlawful force and violence in
such a manner as to create a clear and present danger to the safety of per-
sons or property can be divided into two elements. The first element
22Id. at 551, 552.
23Id. at 551.
2 4 To bold otherwise would seem to make the content of the statutory language so vague and
indefinite as to violate the principles of due process which require fair notice and proper stand-
ards for adjudication. See generally Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960); see also Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. ill.
1968), juris. noted sub. nom. Boyle v. Landry, No. 244, 37 U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S., Dec. 9, 1968).
In the absence of a state court's construction of the statute, a federal court will use ".. . a normal
and natural construction of statutory language or even a narrow interpretation thereof [if it]
will preserve the constitutionality of a statute .. ." Id. at 967.
2 5 The probable definition of intent is purpose. See text accompanying notes 14 through
24, supra.
2 6 Consider the following examples:
(a) A is participating in violent and tumultuous conduct with B, C, D and E. While thus
participating, A is thinking about a misdemeanor he is planning to commit next week. A would
not be guilty of Riot II as the purpose of his present conduct was not to commit or facilitate in
the commission of the future misdemeanor.
(b) A engages in violent and tumultuous conduct with B, C, D and B. A hopes that the
disturbance he creates will decoy law enforcement officers from an area in which G is to commit
a misdemeanor. A would be guilty of Riot II as the purpose of his conduct is to facilitate the
commission of a misdemeanor.
(c) A engages in violent and tumultuous conduct with B, C, D and E in the state house. A
wants the commotion to impede the legislative hearings currently in session. A would be guilty
of Riot II as the purpose of his conduct is to obstruct a function of government.
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can be paraphrased as follows: the purpose to do a lawful act with force
and violence which is without authority of law.
Unlawful is not only a synonym of illegal or criminal,27 but is more
generally defined as characterizing something which is either not sanc-
tioned by law or is against public policy.28 The requirement that the
purpose be to use force and violence without authority of law limits
the scope of the enactment by excepting those situations in which the law
recognizes a justifiable use of force, such as by police officers, to the ex-
tent reasonably necessary to effect an arrest; by persons acting in self-
defense, etc.29
The purpose to use unlawful force and violence must be accompanied
with a purpose to use them in a manner which creates a clear and
present danger to the safety of persons or property. It is interesting to
note that if one injured a person through an act by which he purposely
created a dear and present danger to that person, he could be said to
have knowingly or recklessly injured that person. 0 In this rather limited
sense Riot II might be said to include knowledge or recklessness as in-
tent.
The second element of intent in Riot II is the intent to prevent, co-
erce, hinder, impede or obstruct a function of government. It is quite
clear that a statute applying criminal sanctions to conduct done for the
above purposes could, in some circumstances, restrict the exercise of first
amendment rights. Whether such a statute does, in fact, restrict these
rights and is thus constitutionally invalid depends upon the conduct
which must accompany the purposes. As the cases below indicate, the
requirement in Riot II that the conduct be violent and tumultuous would
seem to avoid constitutional invalidity.
In Edwards v. South Carolina,3 Cox v. Louisiana"2 and Brown v.
Louisianad3 the Supreme Court overturned convictions based on state
statutes which embodied the common law crime of breach of the peace.
In each of these cases the statutes were held unconstitutionally void as
they allowed "... . persons to be punished merely for peacefully express-
ing unpopular views." 4  In none of these cases was there any evidence
of a planned or intended disorder. There was also no evidence of viola-
27 BLACK'S LAW DIcrioNARY 1705, (4th ed. 1951).
2 8 State v. Blackledge, 243 N.W. 534 (Iowa App. 1932); Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass.
111 (1842); Williams v. State, 27 Ala. App. 504, 175 So. 335 (1937).
29 Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 954 (1968).
30 See note 12 supra.
31 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
32379 U.S. 536 (1965).
33 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
34 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965).
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tion of any traffic or other law created for the public safety or con-
venience.
In Edwards the defendants were arrested for participating in a pro-
test at the South Carolina State House. Their conduct was nonviolent
and consisted of ". . . loudly singing 'The Star Spangled Banner' and
other patriotic and religious songs, while stamping their feet and clapping
their hands."" The conduct in Cox was to be very similar to that in
Edwards in that the defendant was to participate in the "... . singing of
the Star Spangled Banner and a 'freedom song,' recitation of the Lord's
Prayer and the Pledge of Allegiance, and a short speech."30  There was
neither violence on the part of the protesters nor were there "fighting
words. '2 7  In Brown the conduct consisted of the defendant's remaining
in a "white" library after being instructed to leave by the librarian. At
no time did Brown participate in making noise, a disturbance or violent
behavior. 8
While the breach of the peace statutes were declared unconstitutional
in all three cases, the majority opinions explicitly expressed the view
that the first amendment offers no protection against convictions based
on a law which was designed to promote the public convenience and
which was not susceptable to discriminatory application. In Cox, the
Court states:
[ojne would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red light because
this was thought to be a means of social protest.... A group of demon-
strators could not insist upon the right to cordon off a street, or entrance
to a public or private building, and allow no one to pass who did not
agree to listen to their exhortations. 39
In Adderley v. Florida0 the majority of the Court upheld the conviction
of civil rights demonstrators for trespassing upon the premises of a county
jail contrary to a Florida trespass statute. The cases based on breach
of the peace statutes were distinguished on the basis that the Florida
trespass statute was not vague. The Court found that Florida had a right
to prohibit people from trespassing on jail grounds and that "Ct~he
United States Constitution does not forbid a State to control the use of
its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose." 41
Riot II does not have the vagueness of the breach of the peace stat-
utes in Edwards, Cox, and Brown.' On the contrary, as has been
35Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 233 (1963).
36 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 540-541 (1965).
37Id. at 547.
38Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 136-137 (1966).
39 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965).
40 385 U.S. 39 ( 1966).
41 Id. at 48.
42 See note 10 supra.
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noted earlier, Riot II would not have sanctioned the arrests in any of
the above cases including Adderley as none of them involved violent and
tumultuous conduct. It would seem from Addedey that instead of in-
fringing the exercise of first amendment rights, the requirement of
violent and tumultuous conduct provides them with more protection than
is required.
In Landry v. Daley8 a three judge federal district court considered
the constitutionality of the Illinois Mob Action Statute, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38 § 25-1. The court held that one subsection of the statute which
imposed criminal penalties on an assembly of two or more persons to do
an unlawful act as impermissively vague and overly broad. 44 It was noted
that the phrase "unlawful act" is not in its normal meaning limited to
criminal acts, but includes torts or other civil wrongsOY It fails to ap-
praise the public of the prohibited act. The court also felt that the sub-
section was ". . . a ready vehicle for the suppression of ideas."46
The other two subsections of the statute were held to be constitutional
on the grounds that they required the use of force or violence which is
not protected by the first amendment.47 The Ohio riot statutes would
seem to be analogous to this latter group.
The third intent (to commit or facilitate the commission of a misde-
meanor), like the second intent, could be directed against civil rights
demonstrations and mass acts of civil disobedience. Again, however,
this intent must be coupled with the participation of four or more others
in violent and tumultuous conduct. This statute does not proscribe mass
actions of peaceful civil disobedience even where misdemeanors are
committed. It would thus seem to go wide of any chance of being inter-
preted as unconstitutional on the grounds of its prohibiting the exercise
of first amendment rights.48
Riot laws are generally subject to two complaints: they are either so
general that they suppress the free expression of dissatisfaction by demon-
stration; or their application is so restricted that they are generally useless
in preventing mass civil disorder that constitutes a serious threat to the
public safety. Riot II seems to avoid both of these objections. While it
embodies many situations which could threaten the public safety, it does
not preclude the exercise of peaceful civil disobedience, or other types of
peaceful mass demonstration.
43 280 F. Supp. 938 (1968).
44 Id. at 955.
451d.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 954, 956.
48 See text accompanying notes 31 through 47 supra. See also note 24 supra.
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B. Riot in the First Degree
The elements of Riot I may be paraphrased as follows:
A. Participation with four or more others in
B. Conduct which is (1) violent or (2) tumultuous
C. (1) With the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a
felony; or (2) to commit or facilitate the commission of any offense in-
volving force or violence against persons, whether such offense is a misde-
meanor or felony; or (3) where the actor or any participant to the knowl-
edge of the actor uses or intends to use a firearm or other deadly weapon
or dynamite or other dangerous explosive, or any incendiary device.
1. Participation
The meaning of the participation which is proscribed in Riot I is the
same as in Riot II. It refers to an activity comprised of violent or tu-
multuous behavior rather than the several intents embodied in the stat-
ute. The element of participation includes not only situations in which
five or more persons engage in violent or tumultuous conduct with a
common purpose, but also the situation in which a person with one of the
three intents contained in the statute joins in the violent or tumultuous
conduct of four strangers.49  The element of participation serves to limit
the application of the statute to those actually engaged in the conduct and
precludes its application to bystanders.n°
2. Conduct
While the words violent and tumultuous have the same definitions
for Riot I as they have for Riot II,r1 Riot I proscribes behavior which is
violent or tumultuous while Riot II proscribes behavior which is violent
and tumultuous. As the result of the use of the disjunctive, Riot I covers
a much wider spectrum of conduct than Riot 11.52 For this reason, among
others, Riot II is not a lesser included offense of Riot 1.53 The justifica-
tion for this wider coverage of Riot I appears to be the more serious nature
of the elements of intent contained in the statute.
4 9 See note 5 supra.
GO The element of participation must be proved in order to obtain a valid conviction. Since
a bystander would not be acting in a violent or tumultuous manner, he would not be partici-
pating and could not be convicted. The possibility that a bystander may be an aider or abettor
is considered in section III of this article infra.
51 See notes 7, 8 and 9 supra.
52 In terms of set theory, Riot I embraces the union of violent conduct and tumultuous
conduct while Riot II embraces only their intersection.
53 While Riot II is not a lesser included offense of Riot I, it is an inferior degree of Riot L
This aspect of Riot I and Riot II are discussed in the text at section IV infra.
1969]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
C. Intent
Riot I requires as an element an intent 4 to commit or facilitate the
commission of a felony, or an intent to commit or facilitate an offense
involving force or violence against persons. The violation is complete
upon the concurrence of one of the above intents and the participation
in violent or tumultuous conduct. Ordinarily a felony or an offense of
force or violence is neither attempted nor committed until a person with
the prerequisite intent begins the actual execution of the conduct which
is proscribed.5 5 Since Ohio law does not impose criminal sanctions for
attempted crimes (except in cases where an attempt comes within one of
the Ohio statutes which cover the attempts of certain specified crimes),"
Riot I could not only impose liability on attempts not previously covered,
but also on activities more remote than attempts.
Prior to the enactment of this statute, the law enforcement official
was sometimes posed with a difficult choice when he had probable cause
to believe that someone or a group of people intended to commit or fa-
cilitate the commission of one of the above crimes under the cover of a
tumultuous or violent situation. If he acted too quickly, there could be
no substantial conviction, since even if the accused admitted to the intent
to commit a felony, he would not yet have legally committed it or even
attempted it.5 7 He could, at most, be convicted of breach of the peace or
some related statute which carries a very light penalty.
If the official waited until the suspects either actually attempted or
completed the commission of the felony, he risked injury to bystanders "
or the escape of the felons in the resulting confusion. Assuming that
there was probable cause to believe that several individuals intended to
commit a felony, officers could under Riot I make an arrest as soon as the
individuals began to participate in the tumultuous behavior and be-
fore they began the actual felony. 9 Although the individuals could not
be convicted of the felony they intended to commit unless they had com-
pleted its execution, they could be convicted of Riot I.
This statute covers many circumstances which are not ordinarily con-
sidered to be riot situations. For example, any felony committed by
five or more people whose conduct is considered to be tumultuous or
violent, would violate Riot I as well as the particular felony statute?0
5 4 See discussion of the word intent with regard to Riot II in text accompanying notes 11
through 26 supra.
55 Fox v. State, 34 Ohio St. 377 (1878).
56 E.g., OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.06 (Page 1953) (Attempt to Bum Property).
57 Fox v. State, 34 Ohio St. 377 (1878).
5 8 Bystanders could be injured either directly by the suspects, by a panic caused by the sus-
pects to cover their crime or escape, or by the efforts of the law enforcement officials to appre-
hend the suspects.
59 See note 24 supra. for discussion of the connection between participation and intent.60 An example would be a case in which five or more persons cooperated in purse snatching.
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In these cases as convictions could seem to be made on both violations,
Riot I, in effect, increases the penalities of certain existing crimes when
they are committed by a group of five or more individuals. The serious
nature of the crimes encompassed in the intents of Riot I seems to jus-
tify this result. The crimes covered in the statute may constitute a greater
danger to the public and apprehending officers when they are committed
by groups of five or more individuals than when they are committed by
an individual or smaller groups.
The only portion of this statute which seems to have a possible con-
stitutional infirmity is the segment dealing with the use or intended use
of deadly weapons in a riot situation. When the subsection is read
closely, it appears that if the actor knows that someone else has used a
firearm, or other deadly weapon, the actor would be guilty of a violation
of Riot I. Under this interpretation, a person who was in a tumultuous
crowd and was himself behaving in a tumultuous manner, could be con-
victed of violating the statute if he heard or saw another member of the
crowd discharge a firearm, or even throw a large rock.6' The judicial
interpretation of tumultuous would seem to include the spectators at a
football rally or the participants of a floor demonstration at a national
political convention.62 This interpretation might well render this section
of the statute unconstitutional on the grounds of overbreadth, since it
appears to have a chilling effect on the exercise of first amendment
rights.63
This possible constitutional defect could be eliminated in several ways.
One of these is to define tumultuous in such a manner that it would ex-
clude all activity which falls under the protection of the first amend-
ment. Previous judicial interpretations of tumultuous, however, would
be at variance with such a definition and it is likely that the legislature
meant the word to have its commonly accepted meaning. 64 For this rea-
son, this approach would not seem to be desirable.
A second approach is to contend that instead of a literal interpreta-
tion of the statute, the legislature meant the following: (C) when the
actor uses, or intends to use, or has knowledge that any participant intends
to use a firearm or other deadly weapon, or dynamite or other dangerous
explosive, or any incendiary device. . . . A judicial interpretation of this
nature would serve to implement the legislative intent to impose or in-
crease penalties for certain acts when they occur under conditions of mass
One person snatched the purse while the other four jostled the victim to district him or dis-
courage him from resisting. This conduct which is violent and tumultuous could result not
only in a conviction for Riot I, but also one for robbery.
61 Acers v. United States, 164 U.S. 388 (1896).
62 See notes 8 and 9 supra.
63Se discussion of the Edwards, Cox, Brown and Adderley cases supra.
64 See notes 7, 8 and 9 supra.
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violence or tumult. At the same time it would not affect the exercise of
first amendment rights. For these reasons, this method is preferred to the
former.
The behavior proscribed by Riot I is, in general, more dangerous to
the public safety than that proscribed by Riot II. In addition to being
applicable to what would ordinarily be considered a riot situation, Riot I
would also seem to apply to crimes of violence in which five or more
people participate. The statute, with the exception of the subsection
dealing with the knowledge or use of deadly weapons, seems to be free
of constitutional defects.
III. A POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF LIABILITY
UNDER RIOT I AND RIOT II BY THE OHIO AIDER
AND ABETTOR STATUTE
A possible exception to the elements developed in the previous section
of this article could result from the application of Ohio's aider and abet-
tor statute:
Any person who aids, abets, or procures another to commit an offense
may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.65
In order to qualify as an alder or abettor a person must generally be in a
prior conspiracy with the principal, encourage the principal to commit
the crime, or do some overt act with an intent to bring about the result.6
This statute could possibly result in the application of Riot I or
Riot II against a conspirator of the principal (actor) although the con-
spirator was not physically present or participating in the violent and/or
tumultuous conduct.67  Under the Ohio cases it would seem necessary for
a conspirator to ". . . combine either by express agreement or by actual
conduct in the commission of an unlawful act, that is, an act made un-
lawful by statute .... ,, to be guilty of Riot I or Riot II. The meaning
of the word combine is ambiguous. The courts usually indicate that in
order to combine a person must have the purpose to commit the illegal
act,6 although at times their language supports the proposition that it is
65 0mo REv. CODE ANN. § 1.17 (Page 1953).
66 Woolweaver v. State, 50 Ohio St. 277, 34 N.E. 352 (1893); Goins v. State, 46 Ohio St.
457, 471, 21 N.E. 476 (1889); State v. Shephard, 15 Ohio App.2d 88, 93, 239 N.E.2d 116
(1968).
67 State v. Doty, 94 Ohio St. 258, 113 N.E. 811 (1916); Breese v. State, 12 Ohio St. 146
(1861); Hess v. State, 5 Ohio 1 (1831); State v. Palfy, 11 Ohio App.2d 142, 229 N.E.2d 76
(1967).
68 Black v. State, 103 Ohio St. 434, 440, 133 N.E. 795 (1921).
69 E.g., Stephens v. State, 42 Ohio St. 150, 153 (1884) (common purpose); Hanoff v. State,
37 Ohio St. 178, 184 (1881) (joint design); Rufer v. State, 25 Ohio St. 464, 473, 474 (1874)
(common design); State v. Uilner, 105 Ohio App. 546 (1957), 143 N.E.2d 849, af'd 167
Ohio St. 521 (1958) (common enterprise); Richards v. State, 43 Ohio App. 212, 183 N.E. 36
(1932) (general conspiracy); Licavoli v. State, 20 Ohio Op. 562, 34 N.E.2d 450 (1935) (con-
spiracy).
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sufficient if one joins the others with the knowledge that they have the
purpose of committing an illegal act.70 The latter position was advanced
and later abandoned by the Model Penal Code.7 1 Under either view, how-
ever, liability is not extended to those who conspire with others to do an
act which, while not unlawful in itself, is likely to result in a violation of
the law.7 2
In addition to the conspiracy it is necessary to show that the violation
of Riot I or Riot II ". . . might have been contemplated, reasonably, as
likely to result from the attempt to commit the act intended. ... ,73 If
an actor and a conspirator intended (as defined above) to violate Riot I,
Riot II, or some other statute which was likely to result in a violation of
Riot I or Riot II, the conspirator would be deemed to have participated in
the crime although not even present. 4
If the sole purpose of the actor and the conspirator were the exer-
cise of a legal right, for example, the organizing and leading of a lawful
demonstration, and, the actor or other members of the demonstration
violated either Riot I or Riot II, the conspirator under the above authority
would not be guilty. This would be true even if the violations were
likely to result from the demonstration. 5
In order to hold otherwise, one would have to contend that the prob-
ability that violence might erupt from such a demonstration is equivalent
to the purpose of having it erupt. In the terms of the Model Penal
Code this would be to hold the conspirator guilty for recklessness or
negligence and not purpose or knowledge with respect to the unlawful
objective of the conspiracy.76 While both the Model Penal Code and the
Ohio cases seem to employ a concept of recklessness or negligence as to
the responsibility for the means used to accomplish the objective,77 the
70 Woolweaver v. State, 50 Ohio St 277, 280, 281, 34 N.E. 352 (1893); State v. Munson,
25 Ohio St. 381 (1874) (selling liquor to an adult with knowledge that adult is going to give it
to a minor makes the seller liable as an aider and abettor); Anderson v. State, 7 Ohio 539
(1836) (Person without knowledge that certificate of deposit is forged cannot be convicted as
an aider and abettor although he helps the forger to pass it.); Crouch v. State, 37 Ohio App. 366,
174 N.E 799 (1930) (Defendant's offer to buy cars from those whom defendant knows will
then go out and steal them is sufficient to make him an aider and abettor to the larceny).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953); MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.06(3) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
72 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3), Comment (Tent Draft No. 1, 1953) at 20-33 for a
general discussion of federal cases relating to this matter. See Anderson v. State, 7 Ohio 539
(1836); State v. Shephard, 15 Ohio App.2d 88, 239 N.E.2d 116 (1968). See also Baldwin v.
State, 23 Ohio Abs. 147 (1936); Galo v. State, 6 Ohio Abs. 588 (1928).
7 3 Goins v. State, 47 Ohio St. 457, 467, 34 N.E. 352 (1893).
74Eg., State v. Dory, 94 Ohio St. 258, 113 N.E. 811 (1916); Stephens v. State, 42 Ohio
St. 150 (1884); Hess v. State, 5 Ohio 12 (1831); State v. Palfy, 11 Ohio App.2d 142, 229
N.E.2d 76 (1967), Licavoli v. State, 20 Ohio Op. 562, 34 N.E.2d 450 (1935).
75 1MODBL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) Comment (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953) at 24; see note 72
supra.
7 6 See note 12 supra.
7 7 See notes 73 and 74 supra.
1969]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
conspirator must have the purpose to commit the illegal act or knowledge
that he is helping others whose purpose is to commit it before liability
is imposed.78
Such an interpretation could also encounter constitutional difficulties
as applied to the exercise of first amendment rights (eg. peaceful demon-
strating) since it could in effect, allow ". . . persons to be punished
merely for peacefully expressing unpopular views.17 9  It would thus
seem to be necessary to show that a person conspired with another for the
purpose of having him engage in certain illegal conduct which, by its na-
ture, could reasonably, and did, result in a violation of Riot I or Riot II
before he could be convicted as an aider and abettor.
Whether other participants in the riotous conduct who are not con-
spirators of the actor are aiders or abettors would seem to depend in
part on whether they knew of the actor's violation and whether they con-
tinued their riotous behavior.8 0 If the other participants were unaware
of the actor's violation, it would seem absurd to hold them as aiders or
abettors as there would be neither purpose nor knowledge. The same
would appear to be true, if, upon becoming aware of the actor's viola-
tion, the other participants disengaged themselves from the riotous be-
havior.81 If, however, upon awareness of the actor's violation, the others
continued their riotous behavior, their status as aiders and abettors is
unclear.
If the actor's violation of the law consisted solely of a violation of
Riot I or Riot II, the continued conduct of the others could not make
them aiders and abettors, since a common law accessory after the fact is
not an aider and abettor in Ohio. 2 This does not, however, mean that
one or more of the other participants could not be violating Riot II. It
is conceivable that any other participant who continued to act violently
and tumultuously with four or more others and knew that the actor
had violated either Riot I or Riot II could under some circumstances be
considered as intending to obstruct a function of government 3 (ie. the
7 8 See notes 69, 70 and 72 suPra.
This standard of negligence for the actual result is not to be confused with the purpose
to commit a criminal act which is required for a conspiracy to exist. For example, A combines
with B and C for the purpose of committing a burglary. During the attempted burglary, B com-
mits a battery on D, an occupant of the house they are burglarizing. A would also be guilty of
the battery on D as the battery is reasonably likely to result (standard of negligence) from
their attempt (purpose) to burglarize.
79 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965). Also see the constitutional arguments dis-
cussed elsewhere in the text.
80 Liability incurred under incitement to riot (OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.54 (Page
Supp. 1968)) is outside the scope of this article.
8 1 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(6) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
82 State v. Lingerfelter, 77 Ohio St. 523, 83 N.E. 897 (1908).
8 3 This result depends to a large extent on the meaning of the word intent as used in Riot
IL As was discussed earlier, this meaning is unclear, but it could include knowledge under
some circumstances. The difference between purpose and knowledge would be minimal where
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apprehension of the actor by the police), and be guilty of Riot II. The
same reasoning would apply if the actor intended to commit or facilitate
one of the other substantive crimes contained in Riot I or Riot II and had
in fact completed it.
If the actor intended to commit (or facilitate) one of the other sub-
stantive crimes contained in Riot I or Riot II, and had not yet completed
it, the continued violent or tumultuous conduct of another person who
knew of the actor's intent might in some circumstances make him an
aider and abettor of the actor in that other crime.8 4  In such a case he
could also be considered as intending to facilitate that crime.s5  De-
pending on the number of people participating and the nature of his
conduct, this could constitute a violation of either Riot I or Riot II.
IV. RIOT II: A LESSER OFFENSE OF RIOT I
Whether riot in the second degree is a lesser offense of riot in the
first degree will be of great importance to both future defendants and
prosecutors. The importance of this question stems not only from its ef-
fect on the informal practice of plea bargaining, but also from the
following considerations which may substantially affect a defendant's
criminal liability: one who is charged with a greater offense can be con-
victed of a lesser offense;88 acquittal or conviction of a lesser offense bars
conviction of the greater offense; 7 conviction of the greater offense bars
conviction of a lesser offense;88 acquittal of the greater offense bars con-
viction of the lesser offense in a later action. 9
Riot II qualifies as a lesser offense of Riot I under the authority of
section 2945.74 OHIO REv. CODE90 which provides:
[w~hen the indictment or information charges an offense, including dif-
ferent degrees ... the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the de-
gree charged but guilty of an inferior degree thereof....
While this statute additionally provides that lesser included offenses are
also lesser offenses, a comparison of the elements of the two riot statutes
will show that Riot II is probably not a lesser included offense of Riot
I. In order to be a lesser included offense of Riot I the elements of Riot
the other participant saw the police trying to apprehend the violator and consciously impeded
them by his conduct.
84 The consideration of what constitutes an aider and abettor for crimes other than Riot I
and Riot I is beyond the scope of this article.
8
r See note 83 supra.
8 6 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.74 (Page 1953).
87 State v. Behimer, 20 Ohio St. 572, 577 (1870).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.74 (Page 1953).
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II must necessarily be present within the essential elements of Riot .91
One need examine the statutes no farther than the element of conduct.
While it is not essential to prove both violent and tumultuous conduct in
Riot I, it is essential to prove them both in Riot II. Riot II, therefore, is
not a lesser included offense of Riot I.
The situation of Riot I and Riot II is analogous to that in State v.
Daniels92 in which the defendant was indicted for aggravated rapeP3 and
subsequently convicted for statutory rape.94 As statutory rape requires
the additional element (in comparison to aggravated rape) that the de-
fendant be at least 18 years old, it cannot be a lesser offense included with-
in aggravated rape.95 The court concluded, however, that because both
statutes represent the crime of rape, and because statutory rape carries a
lesser penalty than aggravated rape, the legislature intended statutory rape
to be an inferior degree of aggravated rape. 6 Riot II is dearly an inferior
degree of Riot I as it not only meets the requirements in Daniels, but is also
so labeled. It is impossible to conclude otherwise.
Roger H. Norman
91 State v. Daniels, 169 Ohio St. 87, 157 N.E.2d 736 (1959); State v. Hreno, 162 Ohio S.
193, 122 N.E.2d 681 (1954); State v. Muskus, 158 Ohio St 276, 109 N.E.2d 15 (1952).
92 169 Ohio St. 87, 157 N.E.2d 736 (1959).
93 Owo REv. CODE ANN. § 2905.02 (Page 1953).
94 OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.03 (Page 1953).
95 State v. Daniels, 169 Ohio St. 87, 100, 157 N.X.2d 736 (1959).
96d. at 101, 102.
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